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Abstract
The precautionary principle (PP) applied to environmental policy stipulates that, in the pres-
ence of physical uncertainty, society must take take robust preventive action to guard against
worst-case outcomes. It follows that the higher the degree of uncertainty, the more aggressive
this preventive action should be. This normative maxim is explored in the case of a stylized dy-
namic model of pollution control under Knightian uncertainty. At time 0 a decisionmaker makes
a one-time investment in damage-control technology and subsequently decides on a desirable
dynamic emissions policy. Adopting the robust control framework of Hansen and Sargent [10],
we investigate optimal damage-control and mitigation policies. We show that optimal invest-
ment in damage control is always increasing in the degree of uncertainty, thus conrming the
conventional PP wisdom. Optimal mitigation decisions, however, need not always comport with
the PP and we provide analytical conditions that sway the relationship one way or the other.
This result is interesting when contrasted to a model with xed damage-control technology, in
which it can be easily shown that a PP vis-a-vis mitigation unambiguously holds. We conduct
a set of numerical experiments to determine the sensitivity of our results to specic functional
forms of damage-control cost. We nd that when the cost of damage-control technology is low
enough, damage-control investment and mitigation may act as substitutes and a PP with respect
to the latter can be unambiguously irrational.
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11 Introduction
A common thread running through much of environmental economics is a reliance on expected utility
as a means of performing cost-benet analysis and, more broadly, as a normative criterion. Expected
utility theory has solid theoretical underpinnings, going back to the groundbreaking work of von
Neumann and Morgenstern [17] and Savage [21], and leads to tractable optimization problems.
However, in the case of environmental economics, its attractive qualities often come at a steep
price, primarily due to two basic factors: (a) the high structural uncertainty over the physics of
environmental phenomena which makes the assignment of precise probabilistic model structure
untenable, and (b) the high sensitivity of model outputs to seemingly ad hoc modeling assumptions
(for instance, the functional form of the chosen damage function and the value of the social discount
rate) on which often little consensus exists. As a result, separate models may arrive at dramatically
dierent policy recommendations, generating heated debate and much confusion over the magnitude
and timing of desirable policy.1
Weitzman [26] has forcefully made the above point in the context of climate-change economics.
Echoing the previous discussion, his main thesis is that the deep structural uncertainty surrounding
the science of climate change creates substantial problems for the application of classical cost-
benet analysis. His assessment rests on the incontestable premise that climate scientists are far
from reaching consensus on the physical eects of unprecedented concentrations of GHGs in the
atmosphere. In particular, state-of-the-art climate science cannot rule out the occurrence of extreme
catastrophic events with nontrivial probability. In addition, Weitzman [27], as well as others (Sterner
and Persson [23]) argue that the results of established economic models (such as Nordhaus' RICE
and DICE models [18]) are too sensitive to the precise way in which damages are mathematically
dened, which constitutes yet another modeling convention that cannot, at present, be scientically
validated to an adequate degree of condence. The main implication of this line of research is
that, in the presence of such extreme uncertainty, it is far from clear how one should model the
economic implications of climate change policy. Indeed, Weitzman himself admits to no grand
theoretical panacea for this impasse and merely concedes that his analysis calls, in a qualitative
sense, for extremely cautious policy-making. While the academic community has been reluctant to
embrace the totality of his analysis (Nordhaus [19]; Karp [13]), Weitzman's work goes a long way
in illuminating the potential pitfalls of discounting the likelihood of extreme climatic events and
cavalierly insisting on a particular modeling framework.
Weitzman's criticism notwithstanding, environmental policy needs to be predicated on a coher-
ent, if simplied, account of its economic implications. We focus our attention on the problem of
deep and structural uncertainty that is dened by an inability to posit precise probabilistic structure
to physical processes. This is close to the concept of uncertainty as introduced by Knight [15] to
represent a situation where there is ignorance, or not enough information, to assign probabilities to
1William Nordhaus' DICE model [18] and the Stern Report [22] are prominent examples of this deep divergence.
2events. Knight argued that this deeper kind uncertainty is quite common in economic decision mak-
ing, and thus deserving of systematic study. Knightian uncertainty is contrasted to risk (measurable
or probabilistic uncertainty) where probabilities can be assigned to events and are summarized by
a subjective probability measure or a single Bayesian prior.
Inspired by the the work of Knight [15] and consequently Ellsberg [4], economic theorists
have questioned the classical expected utility framework and attempted to formally model pref-
erences in environments in which probabilistic beliefs are not of suciently high quality to generate
prior distributions. Klibano et al. [14] developed an axiomatic framework, the so-called \smooth
ambiguity" model, in which dierent degrees of aversion for uncertainty are explicitly parame-
terized in agents' preferences. In their model an act f is preferred to an act g if and only if
Ep(Eu  f) > Ep(Eu  f), where u is a von Neumann Morgenstern utility function,  an
increasing function, and p is a subjective second order probability over a set  of probability mea-
sures  that the decisionmaker is willing to consider (E denotes the expectation operator). When
 is concave the decisionmaker is said to be ambiguity averse. This theoretical framework has
been recently applied to environmental economics, particularly in issues related to climate change
(Traeger [24]; Gollier and Gierlinger [8]; Millner et al. [16]). However, despite its notable role in
the recent literature, the smooth ambiguity model seems to have more of a positive instead of a
normative focus, and questions about how to calibrate agents' ambiguity aversion seem dicult to
address. An additional, potential, shortcoming of the general approach is that it relies on knowl-
edge of second-order probabilities (the distribution p) when, in some instances, such knowledge
may not be possible or justied. Moreover, in the context of applied work, the smooth ambiguity
model seems to pose nontrivial tractability challenges [16] so that only the utility of very simple,
exogenously given, policies can be computed.
Our Focus: Robust Control. In a seminal contribution, Gilboa and Schmeidler [7] developed
the axiomatic foundations of max-min expected utility, a substitute of classical expected utility for
economic environments featuring unknown risk. They argued that when the underlying uncertainty
of an economic system is not well understood, it is sensible, and axiomatically coherent, to opti-
mize over the worst-case outcome (i.e. the worst-case prior) that may conceivably occur. Doing
so guards against possible devastating losses in any possible state of the world and thus adds an
element of robustness to the decision-making process.2 Motivated by the very real possibility of
model misspecication in macroeconomics, Hansen and Sargent [10] and Hansen et al. [11] extend
Gilboa and Schmeidler's insight to continuous-time dynamic optimization problems, introducing
the concept of robust control to economic environments. They show how standard dynamic pro-
gramming techniques can be modied to yield robust solutions to problems in which the underlying
2A simple way to think of this idea is the following: If a company is building an airplane, its primary aim is to
make sure the plane never malfunctions, no matter what (realistic) weather conditions it may face. This concern for
robustness trumps the possible suboptimality of the plane's functions (speed, eciency, to name a few) for what are
considered to be \average" conditions.
3stochastic nature of the model is not perfectly known. In their work, the degree to which a model is
misspecied is a model input, so that decision makers can test the sensitivity of a proposed solution
with respect to the model's presumed uncertainty. Eschewing complex formal characterizations of
their results similar to Klibano et al. [14], the focus of their robustness project is as much practical
as it is theoretical, if not more.
Finally, we should note that Chen and Epstein [2] and Epstein and Schneider [5] developed
a parallel approach to Hansen and Sargent's robust control, which they refer to as the Recursive
Multiple Priors (RMP) model. Similarly inspired by Gilboa and Schmeidler, this framework diers
in subtle ways to robust control, primarily with regard to the set of restricted priors, and their
evolution over time. An additional substantive dierence is that while robust control provides
a method of computing a max-min solution, recursive multiple priors seem to function primarily
as a means of comparing the minimum utility of given policies.3 A recent application of RMP in
environmental economics can be found in Asano [1], who studies the optimal timing of environmental
policy under ambiguity. Asano's analysis deals with stock pollutants and veries the existence of
a precuationary principle (PP), in which an increase in ambiguity implies an earlier adoption of
policy.
Our contribution. In recent years the Hansen-Sargent framework has slowly begun to make its
way into environmental economics. Gonzales [9] applied robust control to the regulation of a stock
pollutant under multiplicative uncertainty (rst introduced by Hoel and Karp [12]). Roseta-Palma
and Xepapadeas [20] studied water management under ambiguity, while Vardas and Xepapadeas [25]
did the same in the context of biodiversity management. Both these contributions focused on
determining the \cost of precaution," that is, the decrease in utility that model misspecication
leads to.
The present work can be viewed as a continuation of this nascent literature in the context of
pollution control. Our paper expands the standard linear-quadratic model of Dockner and Van
Long [3] to allow for (a) model misspecication and (b) the possibility of investment in damage-
control technology that alleviates the eects of stock pollutant accumulation. In the context of
climate change, examples of this kind of damage-control investment can be found in (a) the con-
struction of large-scale civil engineering projects (b) substantial R & D in geoengineering and (c)
the construction of new urban environments to accommodate potential forced migration. We as-
sume the presence of a benevolent government (or, conversely, a group of cooperating countries in a
global pollution control problem) which makes a one-time investment in damage-control technology
at time 0, and subsequently decides on a desirable dynamic emissions policy. Adopting the Hansen-
Sargent robust control framework, we introduce Knightian uncertainty into the model and study
the eect of model misspecication on optimal mitigation and damage-control decisions. Unlike
the aforementioned contributions, we are able to completely characterize the worst-case pollution
3For more details the reader is referred to section 5 in Epstein and Schneider [5] and section 9 in Hansen et al. [11].
4accumulation process and attach a physically meaningful parameter (entropy bound) on the degree
of model misspecication.
Our primary focus is normative. Ex-ante, one would expect a certain kind of precautionary
principle (PP) to hold whereby, the greater the degree of uncertainty, the more the government would
choose to both mitigate and invest in damage control. Indeed, since higher uncertainty translates
to the possibility of higher damages from pollutant accumulation, such a nding would be, more or
less, congruent to our intuition.
But intuitive reasoning can often be (partially) wrong. We show that optimal investment in
damage control technology is always increasing in the degree of uncertainty, thus conrming the
conventional PP wisdom. Optimal mitigation decisions, however, need not always comport with
the PP and we provide analytical conditions that sway the relationship one way or the other. This
result is interesting when contrasted to a model without the possibility for damage control, in which
it can be easily shown that the PP unambiguously holds. Focusing on a tractable family of damage-
control cost functions, we conduct a set of numerical experiments to determine the sensitivity of our
results to specic functional forms. We nd that when the cost of damage control is low enough,
damage-control investment and mitigation may act as substitutes and a PP with respect to the
latter can be unambiguously irrational.
Paper outline. The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the robust control
model, while Section 3 analyzes its solution for the case in which damage-control technology is xed.
Section 4 introduces the possibility of damage-control investment and studies the applicability of a
PP with respect to both mitigation and damage control. Section 5 illustrates our theoretical results
with a numerical exercise that considers a set of dierent damage-control cost functions. Section 6
provides concluding remarks.
2 Robust Pollution Control
2.1 Introducing model misspecication and damage control technology
We employ the standard linear quadratic model of international pollution control analyzed by
Dockner and van Long [3]. Output is a function of emissions Q = F (E); where F () is strictly
concave with F (0) = 0: Emissions contribute to the stock of a global pollutant P (t): The evolution
of the pollution stock is described by the usual linear dierential equation,
_ P(t) = E   mP(t) ;P (0) = P0; (1)
where m > 0 reects the environment's self cleaning capacity. Utility, assuming constant population




E2 + AE: (2)
5We modify the standard quadratic damage function D(P) = sP2; s > 0 by allowing the possibility
of investment in damage control. That is, at time 0, the government chooses a level of damage-
control technology z 2 [0;1] that alters the damage function in the following way
D(P;z) = z  sP2: (3)
Thus, a lower level of z implies a higher investment in damage-control technology. The cost of
making an investment z is modeled by a strictly decreasing and convex function (z) : [0;1] 7! <+
that satises
(1) = 0; lim
z!0
(z) = 1; lim
z!0
0(z) =  1:
Possible candidates for (z) include 1=zk   1, for k > 0.
Risk is introduced to the standard model so that the stock of the pollutant accumulates ac-
cording to the diusion process
dP(t) = (E   mP(t))dt + dB(t); (4)
where fB(t) : t  0g is a Brownian motion on an underlying probabibility space (
;F, G) . Thus,














subject to: (4); P(0) = P0: (5)
Optimization problem (5) is referred to as the benchmark model.
If there were no fear of model misspecication solving the benchmark problem (5) would be
sucient. As this is not the case, following Hansen and Sargent [10], model misspecication can be
reected by a family of stochastic perturbations to the Brownian motion so that the probabilistic
structure implied by SDE (4) is distorted and the probability measure G is replaced by another Q.






where f ^ B(t) : t  0g is a Brownian motion and fv(t) : t  0g is a measurable drift distortion such
that v(t) = v(P(s) : s  t). Thus, changes to the distribution of B(t) are parameterized as drift
distortions to a xed Brownian motion f ^ B(t) : t  0g. The distortions will be zero when v  0 and
the two measures G and Q coincide. Thus pollution dynamics under model misspecication can be
written as:
dP(t) = (E   mP(t) + v(t))dt + dB(t): (7)
As discussed in Hansen and Sargent [10], the discrepancy between the two measures G and Q is







6where E denotes the expectation operator. To express the idea that even when the model is
misspecied the benchmark model remains a \good" approximation, the misspecication error is






EQ[v(t)2]dt   < 1; (9)
where e t is the appropriate discount factor. By modifying the value of  in (9) the decisionmaker
can control the degree of model misspecication he is willing to consider. In particular, if the
decisionmaker can use physical principles and time series analysis to formulate bounds on the
relative entropy of plausible probabilistic deviations from his benchmark model, these bounds can
be used to calibrate the parameter .
2.2 Robust control
Under model misspecication benchmark pollution dynamics (4) are replaced by (7). Two robust
control problems can be associated with the solution to the misspecied problem: (a) a constraint
robust control problem which explicitly models a bound on relative entropy, and (b) a multiplier
robust control problem which incorporates a Lagrange multiplier to a relative entropy constraint.
Formally, the multiplier robust control problem is dened as
















subject to: (7); P(0) = P0; (10)
while the constraint robust control problem is given by














subject to: (7); (9); P(0) = P0: (11)
In both extremization problems, the distorting process vt is such that allowable measures Q
have nite entropy. In the constraint problem (11), the parameter  is the maximum expected
missepcication error that the decision-maker is willing to consider. In the multiplier problem (10),
the parameter  can be interpreted as a Lagrangean multiplier associated with entropy constraint
R(Q)  . Our choice of  lies in an interval (;+1]; where the lower bound  is a breakdown
point beyond which it is fruitless to seek more robustness. This is because the minimizing agent is
suciently unconstrained so that he can push the criterion function to  1 despite the best response
of the maximizing agent. Thus when  < ; robust control rules cannot be attained. On the other
hand when  ! 1 or, equivalently  = 0, there are no concerns about model misspecication and
the decision-maker may safely consider just the benchmark model.
The relationship between the two robust control problems is subtle. For instance, a particular
 can be associated with no, or even multiple, 's, while a particular  can map to multiple 's.4
4For details the reader is referred to Sections 5 and 7 in Hansen et al. [11].
7In what follows, we will focus on the multiplier problem (10). We do so because it is the more
analytically tractable problem of the problem of the two (Fleming and Souganidis [6]). However,
it is worth noting that, in contrast to previous contributions, our subsequent analysis is capable of
providing a connecting thread to the more intuitive, and physically meaningful, constraint formu-
lation. This is because we are able to explicitly characterize the worst-case perturbed probability
measure Q of a given multiplier problem, to which we then apply Proposition 2 in Hansen and
Sargent [10], which establishes the following:
Proposition 1 (Prop. 2, Hansen and Sargent [10]) Suppose V is strictly decreasing in ,  2
(;+1], and that there exists a solution E and v (corresponding to measure Q) to the multiplier
problem (10). Then, that E also solves the constraint problem (11) for  =  = R(Q).
3 Robust pollution control with xed damage control technology
3.1 Problem solution
We initially focus on solving the multiplier problem (10) for a given level of damage control tech-









































Maximizing with respect to E, we have
E = A + VP
so that the dierential equation we need to solve is the following
V = A(A + VP)  
(A + VP)2
2








8One can show that the value function satisfying (14) admits the following simple quadratic form5
V (P;;z) = 1(;z)P2 + 2(;z)P + 3(;z); (15)
where
1(;z) =
2m +   
q














A2 + 2(;z)A  
(A + 2(;z))2
2




















Max-min optimal emissions E satisfy
E(P;;z) = A + VP = A + 2(;z) + 21(;z)P; (19)







(21(;z)P + 2(;z)): (20)
Before we proceed, we note certain properties regarding the curvature of the maxmin value function
V (P0;;z) = 1(;z)P2
0 + 2(;z)P0 + 3(;z) that will be useful later on.
Lemma 1 The maxmin value function V (P;;z) is
(a) Strictly increasing and concave in .
(b) Strictly decreasing and convex in z. Moreover, the partial derivative Vz is increasing in .
Proof. Part (a) can be establishished either through cumbersome dierentiation, or by referring
to Section 5.2 of Hansen et al. [11] and noting that, in our case, Assumption 5.5 holds.






(2m + )2 + 8sz(1   2
 )
< 0 (21)








   1) +  + m
2 =







(2m + )2 + 8sz(1   2
 )
2 < 0; (22)
5To get rid of uninteresting mathematical complications, we only consider  > 
2.



































so we see that this too is negative and increasing in  and z.
Eqs.(21) (22),and (23) further suggest that @






V (P;;z) >  1: (24)
It is easy to see that 1(;z) and 2(;z) are negative and increasing in . Thus, Eq. (19) directly
suggests the presence of a precautionary principle in emission mitigation: the more uncertainty exists
over pollution dynamics, the more one chooses to mitigate emissions at a given pollution level P.
It is equally straightforward to notice that 1(;z) and 2(;z) are decreasing in z. Thus, given
a xed level of misspecication , the less we invest in damage control technology, the more we
mitigate emissions. These results are not at all surprising.
3.2 Characterizing the worst-case pollution accumulation process
Eq. (20) species the worst-case misspecication of our model, given . Substituting it into our




















dt + dB(t) (25)
Eq. (25) points to two pernicious eects of model misspecication. First, there now exists a constant









As we saw earlier, the government reacts to this worst-case scenario by adopting an emissions
strategy E given by Eq. (19). Thus, at optimality, the worst-case pollution process, call it P, is
governed by the following stochastic dierential equation
dP(t) = (E   mP(t) +   v(t))dt + dB(t); (26)







 A + 2(;z)(1   2
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 [21(;z)(1   2















(2m + )2 + 8sz(1   2
 )   
2







(2m + )2 + 8sz(1   2
 )
)





 )   m
 =
4A(m + )
4m2 + 4m + 8sz(1   2
 )
SDE (27) is an instance of the well-known Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process so that we may deduce the
following:
Proposition 2 Stochastic dierential equation (27) has a unique solution given by a Gaussian
diusion process fP(;z;t) : t  0g where
(a) P(;z;t) has expectation
E[P(;z;t)] = ^ P0e[21(;z)(1  2
 ) m]t +
4A(m + )
4m2 + 4m + 8sz(1   2
 )






Var[ ^ P(;z;t)] =
2
q
(2m + )2 + 8sz(1   2
 )   















Proposition 2 also agrees with our intuition. In steady state, the expected value and variance of the
worst-case pollution levels are decreasing in  and z.
Given Proposition 2 and the explicit characterization of the rst and second moments of
























11Thus, we are able to (via Proposition 1) directly associate an entropy bound  to a given ambiguity
parameter , such that the respective multiplier (10) and constraint (11) robust control problems
admit identical solutions.6
4 Solving the optimal investment problem
Suppose that at time 0 a policy maker wants to decide how much to invest in damage-control
technology. In our notation, he or she would like to choose a value of z. Statistical evidence and
climate science suggests a possible model misspecication for the pollution accumulation dynamics
that is captured through an amiguity parameter . The policy maker takes this misspecation
seriously and wishes to guard against it, so that a maxmin criterion is adopted over future welfare.
Recall that V (P0;;z) denotes the maxmin value of a constraint problem mutiplier  with technology




V (P0;;z)   (z) (29)
We now make the following assumption on our model primitives, in order to ensure a \single-
crossing" property on the objective function of (29).





V (P0;;1) < 0(1): (30)
Assumption 1 ensures that the optimization problem (29) corresponding to the case of pure risk
(and no uncertainty) has a unique solution. In the rest of the paper we suppose that Assumption 1
holds.
Lemma 2 Consider optimization problem (29). There exists a unique optimal level of damage-
control investment z, call it z(), that satises
@
@z
V (P0;;z) > 0(z); for all z 2 [0;z())
@
@z
V (P0;;z()) = 0(z());
@
@z
V (P0;;z) < 0(z); for all z 2 (z();1]
Proof. Recall that  is strictly decreasing and convex, and satises 0(0) =  1. This fact, in
combination with Lemma 1, Eq. (24), and Assumption 1, establishes the result.




12Having established this result, we are now ready to investigate the properties of the optimal
solution of (29). We rst address optimal investment in damage-control technology and prove that
it, indeed, is consistent to the PP.
Theorem 1 Optimal damage-control investment strictly increases in model uncertainty. In other
words, z() is strictly increasing in .
Proof. Consider 2 > 1 and the associated optimal investment decisions z(1);z(2). Lemma 2
implies that z(1) uniquely satises
@
@z
V (P0;1;z(1)) = 0(z(1)):






V (P0;1;z(1)) = 0(z(1)):
Consequently, Lemma 2 implies that
@
@z
V (P0;2;z;) > 0(z); for all z 2 [0;z(1));
so that it must be the case that z(2) > z(1).
Theorem 1 conrms the PP in the case of damage control investment. We now address this
question in the context of optimal mitigation policies.
Lemma 3 The optimal solution of optimization problem (29) is such that the values of d
d1(;z())
and d


























Proof. Consider  and the associated optimal z(). We begin with part (a) and consider
1(;z()). The result immediately follows from dierentiating with respect to  and recalling




























   1) +  + m
2 (32)
Part (b) now follows from Eqs. (31) and (32).












;  2 [min;max]; (33)









;  2 [min;max]; (34)

















;  2 [min;max] (35)
then emissions will be decreasing in  for  2 [min;max] if and only if current pollution levels
are high enough.
Proof. Follows immediately from Lemma 3 and the fact that, as Eq. (19) suggests, E(;z;P) =
A + 21(;z)P + 2(;z).
Remarks. From Theorem 1 we know that dz







(;0) = 0 (36)













Therefore, the conditions of Theorem 2 are not generically false so that it is, theoretically, possible
for mitigation to down up as uncertainty goes up. Moreover, Eqs. (16), (36), and (37) imply that











14The above discussion suggests that, in some instances, the precautionary principle may only be
manifest in our choice of damage-control technology, particularly in cases where z is low and
sensitive to changes in . Hence, we arrive at the following corollary of Theorem 2.
Corollary 1 The right-hand side of Eq. (33) is increasing in z(), and vanishes at z() = 0.
Hence, fow high enough levels of optimal damage-control investment (i.e., low enough z()), emis-
sions will be decreasing in , provided the rate of change of z() is high enough. In other words,
if optimal levels of damage-control investment are both high enough and suciently sensitive to
changes in uncertainty, then we observe a reversal of the PP with regard to mitigation.
The intuition behind this result can be described in the following way: If damage-control investment
is sensitive to , then an increase in uncertainty will cause a large increase in damage-control
investment, which in turn will reduce damages from time 0 onwards. If this reduction is suciently
large then, since more mitigation is also costly, incentives to mitigate weaken to the extent that
mitigation is actually reduced. In this case we observe that when uncertainty increases, damage-
control investment and mitigation become substitutes rather than complements.
A heuristic algorithm for solving the constraint robust control problem. Clearly, the
above analysis captures model misspecication through a multiplier robust control problem. How-
ever, as we mentioned earlier, an ambiguity parameter  tends to have no direct physical meaning;
instead, it functions as a Lagrange multiplier of a constraint on relative entropy. By contrast, rela-
tive entropy bounds do have physical meaning as their determination is based on physical principles
and statistical analysis of time series data. Thus, the question naturally arises: Can we derive op-
timal mitigation and damage-control policies under a constraint  on relative entropy? The answer
is most likely yes, through the following heuristic \algorithm":
1. Suppose that physical science and time series analysis suggests a model misspecication of .
Pick  > 2 at random.
2. Solve optimization problem (29) and determine z().
3. Use Eq. (28) to calculate  = R(Q(;z())). By Proposition 1 the constraint problem with
an entropy bound  will admit an identical solution as the one we have just computed through
the multiplier problem .
4. If  > , pick a bigger  and repeat steps 2 and 3. Otherwise, pick a smaller  and do the
same. Repeat until the derived  is close enough to the given .




15so that step 4 may not necessarily lead to convergence. Addressing the monotonicity of R(Q(;z()))
with respect to  in full generality is complicated by the countervailing eects that  and z have








Thus, it becomes clear that we cannot immediately deduce that worst-case entropy will be decreasing
in . Still, numerical results indicate that an increase in  signicantly outweighs its attendant
increase of z (see Section 5 and Table 1), and we are condent that the above algorithm is a useful
way of embedding entropy bounds in our robust control problem.
5 The eect of damage-control cost  on precaution
In this section we explore how changes in the cost function  aect optimal mitigation and damage




zk   1; k  1; (38)
so that (z;k1) > (z;k2) (unless of course z = 0 or 1) and 0(z;k1) < 0(z;k2) whenever k1 > k2.
Hence cost (marginal cost) is increasing (decreasing) in k. We begin with a natural result.
Proposition 3 Fix a level of uncertainty  and consider a family of optimization problems (29),
parametrized according to Eq. (38).
(a) Optimal values of z(;k) are increasing in k. In other words, optimal levels of damage-control
investment are decreasing in the cost of damage control technology.
(b) Optimal emissions are decreasing in k. In other words, optimal levels of mitigation are in-
creasing in the cost of damage-control technology.
Proof. Part (a) follows from Lemma 2 and the fact that 0(z;k1) < 0(z;k2) whenever k2 > k1.
Part (b) follows from part (a) and Eqs. (16) and (17).
Proposition 3 is not surprising. The more expensive damage-control technology is, the less
we can expect to invest in it. Moreover, this decrease in damage control means that additional
mitigation is necessary, to protect against high pollution concentrations. Proposition 3 holds for
every level of uncertainty  > 2.
A numerical example. We now examine the eect of  on precautionary behavior, as we vary
. To make the analysis concrete, we focus on the following problem instance:
P0 = 100; m =  = :03; A = 100; s = 1; 2 = 1:

















z(1;k) as a function of  for k = 1;2;::;6.
We already know from Theorem 1 that optimal damage-control investement will be increasing
in uncertainty, i.e., that z(;k) is increasing in , for all cost functions (38). Indeed this can be
seen in Figure 1. On the other hand, Figure 2 illustrates Proposition 3 and shows how, given a level
of uncertainty , optimal damage-control investment will be decreasing in the cost of technology.
But while our choice of cost function does not aect the precautionary principle vis-a-vis optimal
damage-control investment, the situation is not so simple in the case of mitigation. Indeed, all three
cases of Theorem 2 may occur for dierent values of k. The case in which k = 1:5 corresponds to
part (a) of Theorem 2 (see Figure 3), k = 2 to part (c) (see Figure 4), and k = 3:5 (see Figure 5)
to part (b).
Taken together, our numerical results indicate that when the cost of damage-control technology
is low enough (i.e., when k is small) we are in a situation in which the precautionary principle with
regard to mitigation unambiguously does not hold. This can be explained by the fact that in such
cases, the government will choose to invest a lot in damage control technology and the intuition of
Corollary 1 will be applicable.
6 Conclusion
The present paper analyzed optimal pollution control policy under Knightian uncertainty by adopt-
ing the robust control framework of Hansen and Sargent [10]. Allowing for a one-time investment in

















Figure 2: z(;k) as a function of  for k = 1;2;::;6.
















Figure 3: Emissions as a function of P for dierent : (k = 1:5;P0 = 100). This case corresponds
to part (a) of Theorem 2.















Figure 4: Emissions as a function of P for dierent : (k = 2;P0 = 100). This case corresponds to
part (c) of Theorem 2.














Figure 5: Emissions as a function of P for dierent : (k = 3:5;P0 = 100). This case corresponds
to part (b) of Theorem 2.
19k  E[P] Var[P] 
1.5 1.1 3112 15.9 37131
1.5 1.5 2584 14.1 18663
1.5 2 2267 13 9995
1.5 3 1967 11.8 4221
1.5 4 1814 11.2 2312
2 1.1 2592 14.1 456998
2 1.5 1346 9.4 166074
2 2 874 7.2 70910
2 3 551 5.4 24063
2 4 400 4.7 11841
3.5 1.1 720 6.45 8333650
3.5 1.5 119 2.38 614720
3.5 2 62.8 1.7 163497
3.5 3 35.8 1.2 41990
3.5 4 7.93 1.04 18818
Table 1: Steady-state expectation/variance and relative entropy of worst-case pollution levels P,
as a function of k and .
20damage-control technology, in addition to gradual emissions mitigation, we studied the applicability
of a precautionary principle with respect to both damage control and mitigation. Our main nding
is that while investment in damage-control technology is always increasing in uncertainty, optimal
mitigation is not. Indeed, if optimal levels of damage-control investment are both high enough and
suciently sensitive to changes in uncertainty, then we observe a reversal of the PP with regard
to mitigation. We consider this to be an interesting consequence of the interaction between two
dierent ways of reducing pollution-related damages.
From a normative standpoint our analysis implies that, depending on the cost of damage-
control technology and the magnitude of uncertainty, it may be preferable to be precautious now
by undertaking large damage-control investment, and not be particularly precautious with respect
to future mitigation policy. Indeed, when this is the case, current damage-control investment and
future mitigation act as substitutes. On the other hand, when damage-control investment is costly,
it can act as a complement to future mitigation and an increase in uncertainty induces precaution
with respect to both policy actions. We think that these results provide new insights into the
question of when and how to be precautious in the design of pollution control policy in the context
of robust decision making.7 Interesting future work along similar lines would extend the basic model
to incorporate dynamic damage-control investment, more intricate pollution dynamics, as well as
lower bounds on emissions that would reect concerns about irreversibility.
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